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It’s a Blowhorn, Not a Dog-Whistle:
How President Trump’s Travel Ban Orders,
Not His Statements, Are Enough to Establish
a Violation under the Religion Clauses
by CHARLES ADSIDE, III*

Introduction
Most bigots speak softly. They use dog-whistles, code words employed
to prime bigoted sentiments within the listener.1 Not President Donald J.
Trump; his voice on Islam is like a blow horn.2 His orders imposing travel
bans on seven Muslim-majority countries were just as loud. Although the
Trump v. Hawaii Court claimed that the executive order it reviewed was
religiously neutral, adherence to precedent reveals that all three executive
orders violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.3 There is
much discussion, however, regarding the President’s remarks about Islam.
Many jurists conclude that they should be used for interpretative purposes in

*Lecturer, University of Michigan, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan–
Ann Arbor; General Counsel, Michigan Great Lakes Second Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, Church of
God in Christ, Inc.; J.D., Michigan State University College of Law; B.A., University of Michigan–
Ann Arbor. I am grateful to my parents, Rev. Charles and Jacqueline J. Adside. I thank other family
members, such as my grandmother, Lovie D. Johnson, and my uncles and aunts, Paul and Kim
Minor and Romie and Laurie Minor. This Article would not have been written without
contributions from dedicated research assistants. Sometimes they sacrificed Friday nights and
weekends to ensure this project’s success. I am fortunate to have had them work with me. I thank
Jonathan George and Nicholas Tomaino who served as a senior research assistants. Jacob
Chludzinski worked as the team project manager. Seamus Lynch edited this manuscript. Carlton
Shane, Gabriel Slater, and Alexander Votta provided extensive research and writing support for
this Article. Mohamad Zawahra inspired this writing.
1. See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1505-14 (2005)
(discussing research which reported that certain words subliminally primed stereotypical, and
sometimes racist, views about whites and blacks among test participants). Ian Haney Lopez, The
racism at the heart of the Reagan presidency, https://www.salon.com/2014/01/11/the_racism_
at_the_heart_of_the_reagan_presidency/.
2 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435-38 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(presenting at least 20 anti-Muslim statements from President Trump).
3. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
[267]
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First Amendment controversies. The reason given for doing so is that they
reveal that the travel bans are no different than the exclusion orders in
Korematsu v. United States.
The Korematsu Court held that the forced relocation of JapaneseAmericans during the Second World War did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, because the exclusion constituted a public necessity.
Military imperatives left no time for the government to distinguish loyal
Japanese from disloyal ones.5 That decision is universally assailed today.6
In fact, Trump v. Hawaii explicitly reversed the decision.7 But Justice
Sotomayor’s Dissent argued that dismissing President Trump’s statements
while upholding his travel ban made Trump v. Hawaii logically similar to
Korematsu.8 The statements reveal, some argue, religious animus while
race-based exclusion orders reveal racial animus.9 Personally, I agree, but
the statements are not necessary to establish a constitutional violation, even
as they are contrary to our constitutional values.
The Founders rejected a pure democratic system in part because they
feared the rise of demagogues, who inflame group resentments for political
purposes.10 These politicians do not address nuanced dimensions of public
4. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that a reasonable observer
would consider President Trump’s statements and conclude that the Proclamation was motivated
by Muslim animus); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 2018)
(“Perhaps in implicit recognition of the rawness of the religious animus in the President’s preelection statements, the Government urges us to disregard them. This is a difficult argument to
make given that the President and his advisors have repeatedly relied on these pre-election
statements to explain the President’s post-election actions related to the travel ban.”) (footnote
omitted); Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the government’s appeal
of an emergency stay of the lower court’s injunction in part because “the States have offered
evidence of numerous statements by the President about his intent to implement a ‘Muslim ban’ as
well as evidence they claim suggests that the Executive Order was intended to be that ban, including
sections 5(b) and 5(e) of the Order. It is well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face
of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause
claims.”); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, at 34-35 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3518057/Order.pdf (The Government appropriately
cautions that, in determining purpose, courts should not look into the “veiled psyche” and “secret
motives” of government decisionmakers and may not undertake a “judicial psychoanalysis of a
drafter’s heart of hearts.” The Government need not fear. The remarkable facts at issue here require
no such impermissible inquiry. “For instance, there is nothing ‘veiled’ about this press release:
‘Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States.[]’”).
5. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
6. Trump, 138 U.S. at 2423 (calling Korematsu “morally repugnant”).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2447.
9. Id. at 2435-38.
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histd
ox/fed_10.html (“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose
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policy; rather, they employ calculated “culturally emasculating images” to
stigmatize opponents.11 They don’t care about individual rights, and they
avoid meaningful dialogue.12 Instead, they seek raw political power.13
Alexander Hamilton observed that “demagogues” begin their public careers
appealing to populist sentiment to project the image that they are the people’s
champion, but end their tenures as “tyrants.”14 In Federalist Paper No. 10,
James Madison warned that such leaders are dangerous to the body politic
because they arouse “factions” “who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens.”15 The United States Constitution was designed to hinder the rise
of such characters, and adhered to republican principles to do so.16 However,
the Founders recognized that the normal operations of democracy in the
constitutional system were at risk from the “tyranny of the mob.”17
Southern politicians turned the Framers’ nightmares into reality. “In
the twentieth century, racist demagogues refined methods to control public
discourse, encouraging hysteria about desegregation as an alien threat to
Southern life.”18 Their rhetoric aimed to incite communities to violence via
racist demagoguery.19 For instance, one governor earned a notorious
reputation for angering crowds about “beastly black men” raping virgin
white women: “We would be justified in slaughtering every Ethiop on earth
to preserve unsullied the honor of one Caucasian home.”20 Not one to be
outdone, Senator Theodore G. Bilbo of Mississippi demanded that white
males thwart black suffrage: “I call on every red-blooded white man to use

fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress
each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to
fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous
and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their
most violent conflicts.”).
11. Michele Goodwin, The Economy of Citizenship, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 129, 186-94 (2003).
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
histdox/fed_01.html (“[T]hose men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest
number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing
demagogues, and ending tyrants.”).
14. Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
16. Id.
17. Jamin B. Raskin, From “Colorblind” White Supremacy to American Multiculturalism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 749 (1996) (arguing that James Madison’s concern about the
“tyranny of the mob” can apply to racial minorities that were terrorized by white majorities).
18. Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside, III, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence, and the Legacy of Racial Silence, 22 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1042 (2014).
19. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 261-71 (1949)
(describing “Rural Demagogues”).
20. JAMES C. COBB, THE MOST SOUTHERN PLACE ON EARTH 147 (1992).
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any means to keep the n[———] away from the polls[;] if you don’t
understand what that means you are just plain dumb.”21 What he meant, of
course, was lynching: the torture, mutilation, and murder of black men by
white mobs. Politicians like Senator Bilbo knew what they were doing, and
did it well. They stirred up terror against blacks in a region where lynching
was ominous, routine, and heinous.22 Such appeals to violence by elected
officials against an entire group seems unthinkable today.
Near the dawn of the 21st century, many hoped that such open bigotry
was dead. Some commentators argued that we now live in an inclusive, even
post-bigoted society, where characteristics like race no longer matter.23 And
yet, like a phoenix, public bigotry rises from the ashes: “[A] cottage industry
of radio hosts, television personalities, and even politicians now specialize
in manufacturing ethnic conflict by injecting divisive speech into political
discourse; this dynamic is not limited to any political ideology or party.”24
21. Robert L. Fleeger, Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism, 1938-1947, THE
JOURNAL OF MISSISSIPPI HISTORY, http://www.mdah.ms.gov/new/wp-content/uploads/2013/07
/bilbo.pdf.
22. Cobb, supra note 22, at 114-115, 163 (discussing lynch mobs attacking blacks in the Deep
South).
23. The use of the term “post-bigoted society” as an umbrella term to not only include race, but
other protected categories like religion in our discussion. The phrase “post-racial” has been more
developed, however. See Girardeau A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, 5 THE MOD. AM. 26, 39
(2009) (“[A] prospective commitment to colorblind race neutrality is now sufficient to promote
racial equality, and any deviation from such neutrality will itself constitute unlawful discrimination.
Although versions of this view have been around since the era of official segregation, the claim
that we now live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility from the success of
prominent racial minorities in roles that were traditionally reserved for whites. Those successes
have ranged from the golfing achievements of mixed-race Tiger Woods in a traditionally white
game, to the selection of black politician Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party, to the
election of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.”) (footnotes omitted);
Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J.
967, 968 (2010) (“Post-racialism is a set of beliefs that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination
is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial
progress. One practical consequence of a commitment to post-racialism is the belief that
governments—both state and federal—should not consider race in their decision making.”). But
see Reginald T. Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the Age of Obama, 31
CAMPBELL L. REV. 503, 503–05 (2009) (observing that claims that the United States is a post racial
society with the election of Barack Obama to the presidency are “decidedly premature.”); Nikole
Hannah-Jones, The End of the Postracial Myth, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 15, 2016) (arguing that
Donald Trump’s election to the presidency disproves that the post-racial theory as many Trump
supporters were primed by racial anxiety).
24. Charles Adside, III, Replay That Tune: Defending Bakke on Stare Decisis, 64 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 519, 559 (2016) (some scholars conclude that a variety of topics that confront the public
are still vulnerable to demagoguery, which prevents collective action or impoverishes discussion
on critical issues). Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual “Invasion”: Past as Prologue in
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 392 (2018) (referring to
President Trump’s anti-Muslim statements as “nativists demagoguery”); Robert A. Ferguson, The
Immigrant Plight/Immigration Law: A Study of Intractability, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 241, 248–
49 (2012) (accusing politicians, like Senator John McCain and Governor Jan Brewer, of engaging
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Presidential electoral politics is not immune. Like Noah, President Trump is
“perfect in his generation” among the demagogues. For three decades, he
has injected hateful rhetoric into the national discourse with abandon.25
in “excessive rhetoric” and “demagoguery” with claims that illegal immigrants intentionally cause
car wrecks or commit beheadings in Arizona); David Aronofsky, The War on Terror: Where We
Have Been, Are, And Should Be Going, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 90, 102 (2012) (identifying
“political demagoguery” as creating a climate in which Congress cannot pass legislation to
adequately address the status of combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay); Muriel Morisey, Fifty
Years After the Sit-Ins: Events, Trends, and Recommendations, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 82, 92
(2010) (claiming that the opponents of the Affordable Care Act “engaged in demagoguery” by
fostering the belief that the law would “kill grandma”).
25. Well before his presidency, Donald J. Trump interjected rank bigotry into public discourse,
making claims with no basis in fact. In 1989, he purchased full-page advertisements in four New
York City newspapers, calling for the death penalty in response to the arrest of five black and Latino
teenagers, known as the Central Park Five. The teens were wrongfully accused and sentenced for
the rape of a white woman. Even though the teens were recently exonerated via DNA evidence,
President Trump refused to apologize for his advertisements. Jan Ransom, Trump Will Not
Apologize for Calling for Death Penalty Over Central Park Five, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/central-park-five-trump.html. Years later, Trump
continued to arouse racial suspicions, becoming the national spokesperson for “birtherism.” In this
role, he accused the first black president of being born in Kenya and thus ineligible to occupy the
office. Aaron Sharockman, Full Flop: Donald Trump abandons Barack Obama birther conspiracy,
POLITIFACT (Sept. 16, 2016, 11:33AM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/
2016/sep/16/donald-trump/full-flop-donald-trump-abandons-barack-obama-birth/; U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of
President.”). This debunked claim had profound racial implications, since the Court held, in Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), that blacks could not be American citizens. He based his
presidential campaign on xenophobic fears too, announcing that “When Mexico sends its people,
they’re not sending their best . . . . They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re
bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.
And some, I assume, are good people.” Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement
Speech, TIME (June 16, 2015), https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
As president, he justified hate crimes, drawing a moral equivalence between white supremacists
and so-called left-wing activists during a clash. A neo-Nazi ran into a crowd with his truck, injuring
nineteen people and killing one during a demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia. There, neoNazis marched with tiki torches and clubs to protest the removal of a statue honoring Confederate
General Robert E. Lee, chatting “You will not replace us!” and “Jews will not replace us!” Joe
Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/. After the tragedy,
the President argued that “I think there is blame on both sides,” he remarked in a press conference,
“You had a group on one side that was bad. You had a group on the other side that was also very
violent. . . .” Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html. Shockingly, he
believes that African and Afro-Caribbean nations are inferior, debasing them as “shithole
countries” in a meeting with senators. Ali Vitali, Kasie Hunt & Frank Thorp V, Trump referred to
Haiti and African nations as ‘shithole’ countries, NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 11, 2018, 2:19 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-na
tions-n836946. President Trump dismisses his political opponents on racial and religious grounds,
denouncing his non-white critics as un-American. Referring to four Congresswomen of color, he
tweeted “[w]hy don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from
which they came.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 14, 2019, 5:27 AM),
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On his campaign website, then-candidate Donald J. Trump proposed a
religious test for entry into the United States; “Calling for a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”26 He justified
his position to CNN’s Anderson Cooper, saying that “Islam hates us . . . .
[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of the
United States . . . .”27 Then-candidate Trump gave historical precedent for
his “Muslim ban,” recounting that President Franklin D. Roosevelt “did the
same thing” when he excluded the Japanese during World War II.28 The
Trump administration ordered these sentiments into public policy.29
If this demagoguery didn’t help him in the election, it didn’t hurt him:
he won. He lost no time in seeking to keep this campaign promise.
President Trump issued three travel bans in less than nine months. In
January 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order No. 13769 (“EO-1”)
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1150381395078000643 (emphasis added). All four
Congresswomen are, in fact, American citizens, and three are natural born citizens. Domenico
Montanaro, Trump’s ‘Go Back’ Rhetoric Is Sign Of A Racially Divisive And Turbulent Year
To Come, NPR (July 19, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/19/743310472/
trumps-go-back-rhetoric-is-sign-of-a-racially-divisive-and-turbulent-year-to-com.
His
interactions with crowds are borderline incitement. On one occasion, the President joked
about vigilante justice against illegal immigrants at the border. Asking a crowd in Panama
City Beach, Florida, what should be done when unarmed border patrol agents confront
thousands of migrants, a crowd member shouted “‘Shoot ‘em!’ as laughter and cheers rang
out across the room . . . . Trump seemed to laugh and pointed to the crowd member who said
it, before joking: ‘That’s only in the Panhandle you can get away with that statement,’ as the
crowd continued to clap and cheer. ‘Only in the Panhandle!’” Chantal Da Silva, Donald
Trump Jokes about Shooting Migrants at the Border: ‘That’s Only in The Panhandle You Can
Get Away With That Statement,’ NEWSWEEK (May 9, 2019, 3:33 AM), https://www.news
week.com/donald-trump-jokes-about-shooting-migrants-border-thats-only-panhandle-you-142
0611.
26. Trump v. Haw., 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
27. Id.; Theodore Schleiter, I think Islam Hates Us CNN POLITICS, (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/index.html (“I think Islam
hates us,” Trump told CNN’s Anderson Cooper, deploring the “tremendous hatred” that he said
partly defined the religion. He maintained the war was against radical Islam, but said, “it’s very
hard to define. It’s very hard to separate. Because you don’t know who’s who.”).
28. Id. at 2435.
29. To be sure, these statements were not gaffes. Nor were they “got-cha” moments. Rather,
they were calculated messages designed to prime anti-Muslim attitudes among certain voters. See
supra note 2. He promised to put Muslim immigrants through “extreme vetting” before entry and
then place them on a national registry. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). These measures were necessary, because “Islam hates us,” the President exclaimed.
Id. at 2417. These statements primed a public which negatively views Muslims. See generally
Polling Report. Com: Religion, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2019]). Citing to a comprehensive study, Professors Sides and Gross found that “[o]n average,
respondents saw both Muslims and Muslim-Americans as more violent than peaceful and as more
untrustworthy than trustworthy.” John Sides & Kimberly Gross, Stereotypes of Muslims and
Support for the War on Terror, 75 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 583, 587 (2013). In fact, “[f]ortyfive percent of respondents placed Muslim-Americans on the ‘violent’ side of the spectrum, and
51% placed Muslims on this side of the scale.” Id.
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entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States.”30 It banned foreign nationals from seven majority-Muslim nations
from entering the United States for 90 days.31 It also suspended the Refugee
Admissions Program (“RAP”) for 120 days.32 However, the order, in
Section 5(e), carved out an exception. It permitted the admission of refugees
when doing so was in the national interest, and said this condition was met
when the person is a “religious minority” in their county.33 This is a religious
gerrymander, where the law is drawn up in a way that favors one religion
over the other, in the same way that traditional gerrymandering draws
political boundaries to favor one political party over another.34 This would
have allowed the Trump Administration to admit more Christians from the
Middle East, a major goal of the evangelical Christian wing of the
Republican Party.35 This religious gerrymander is institutionalized in
Section 5(b), which instructs that upon the resumption of RAP, the
administration had to “prioritize” a refugee claim if it met two requirements:
(1) the claim is based on religious persecution, and (2) the claimant is a
religious minority in their country.36 The District Court for the Western
District of Washington blocked the order, however, on First and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.37
Over a month later, the President revoked EO 1 and replaced it with
Executive Order No. 13780 (“EO-2”).38 EO-2 explained that the refugee
prioritization program for religious minorities “was not motivated by animus
toward any religion.”39 And yet, EO-2 removed E.O. 1’s language that
prioritized refugee claims found in Sections 5(b) and 5(e).40 This raises a
question. If EO-1 did not discriminate on the basis of religion, then why
revoke its prioritization program for refugee claims based on religious
minority status? This change seems more prompted by the prospect of legal
challenges than specific policy concerns. The Trump administration tried to
30. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27. 2017) [hereinafter EO-1].
31. EO-1, supra note 32 at 8978.
32. EO-1, supra note 32 at 8979. Only the entry of Syrian refugees was suspended
indefinitely. The order mentioned countries that didn’t meet safety standards. Then, DHS named
these countries.
33. EO-1, supra note 32 at 8979-80.
34. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
35. Marco Rubio and Russell Moore: This Christmas, we must remember slaughtered
Christians in the Middle East. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/
12/24/marco-rubio-and-russell-moore-this-christmas-we-must-remember-slaughtered-christians-i
n-the-middle-east/.
36. EO-1, supra note 32 at 8979.
37. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403 (2018) (The Court entered a temporary restraining order
blocking the restrictions.).
38. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). [hereinafter EO-2].
39. EO-2, supra note 38 at 13,210.
40. See generally EO-2 and EO-1.
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achieve two mutually exclusive objectives. Stunningly, the order also
removed Iraq from the target list.41 EO-2 claimed that Iraq presented “a
special case,” arguing that, since EO-1, the “Iraqi government has expressly
undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and
the return of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of removal.”42
Apparently, Iraq performed this Herculean task in one month and a
week—miraculous, but not surprising, for a country as well-run and honest
as Iraq. That order expired.43
In September 2017, the President issued a third order, entitled
“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States or Other Public-Safety Threats” (“EO-3”).44
This order imposed restrictions on entry of immigrants from seven
countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—
because these nations did not meet the administration’s “baseline” for
sharing information about the identities of those seeking entry into the
United States.45 On procedural grounds, the Court concluded that this order,
and only this order, was before it.46
Trump v. Hawaii held that E.O. 3 was legal; the President could suspend
the entry of undocumented people47 from the covered nations. The Court
found that Section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act “exudes
deference” to presidential findings that entry of a class of undocumented
people would be detrimental to the United States.48 Thus, the procedures
developed to determine whether a country met the “baseline” for information
sharing were more than enough to make President Trump’s “findings”
permissible.49 However, while Section 1182(f) is deferential to presidential
findings, no statute can empower the President to abrogate provisions of our
Constitution.50 The Religion Clauses supersede any presidential order that
construes a congressional enactment to impose a Muslim ban on entry into
the United States. On this issue, the Justices disagreed as to whether
President Trump’s statements should be used to interpret the order.51 There
41. EO-2, supra note 38 at 13212.
42. Id.
43. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2404. The order expired September 24, 2017, when the
President issued his new proclamation.
44. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter EO-3].
45. EO-3, supra note 43 at 45164.
46. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404.
47. The legalese “alien” is replaced with undocumented people or persons hereinafter.
48. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408.
49. Id. at 2400-01.
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
51. Compare Trump v. Haw., 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (“Plaintiffs argue that this President’s words
strike at fundamental standards of respect and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional tradition.
But the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance of
those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within
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are competing views. One may argue that presidential or campaign
statements are more reliable than legislative history.52 The argument for the
reliability of legislative history posits that an interpreter consults a
voluminous amount of information to discover the intent of a multi-member
body, such as floor statements or committee reports.53 Executive intent, on
the other hand, only requires an interpreter to investigate a single mind. By
this argument, if legislative history is a permissible source for statutory
interpretation, then presidential statements are even better. But like “extreme
vetting,” these statements are subject to “extreme manipulation” because the
President can issue new proclamations, signing statements, or have aides
appear on CNN, FOX, MSNBC or any other news broadcasts to convey
propaganda designed to obscure or reinterpret the purpose of his actions.54
We cannot tell if they were telling the truth at one point but not another.
This Article concludes that this debate on these bigoted statements are
unnecessary to resolve constitutional questions under the First Amendment.
All three orders violated the Religion Clauses on their own terms, structure,
and circumstances. Importantly, Religion Clause jurisprudence should lead
interpreters to examine EO 1. President Trump issued EO-2 and EO-3 in
response to litigation designed to conceal anti-Muslim bias in federal
courthouses. Viewed in context, EO-2 and EO-3 actually reveal a religious
test for entry. However, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court put on blinders, and
pointed to EO-3 as the only order before it.55 This shortsighted view is
contrary to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which requires a
contextualized approach to evaluating the actions at issue. The Court has
not been so easily fooled in the past.
In McCreary v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, the Court
used the context of actions to uncover an impermissible motive; they
invalidated a religious display, even though the plaintiff (a Kentucky county)
changed their displays three times in response to litigation.56 The Court
found that the third display did not remove the religious motive in the first

the core of executive responsibility.”) with id. at 2435-38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although
the majority briefly recounts a few of the statements and background events that form the basis of
plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge . . . that highly abridged account does not tell even half of the
story . . . . The full record paints a far more harrowing picture, from which a reasonable observer
would readily conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by hostility and animus toward the
Muslim faith.”).
52. See infra Part I.C of this Article; Presidential Statements Are Worse Than Legislative
History.
53. Id.
54. See infra Part I.C of this Article; Presidential Statements Are Worse Than Legislative
History.
55. 138 S. Ct. at 2404.
56. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2003). See infra Part II. A; Three
Displays, Three Orders: How McCreary and Trump v. Hawaii Are Similar.
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display, as the government’s actions were not “genuine, but a sham.”57 The
changes were only meant to conceal the government’s religious intent. This
Article contends that there are stark parallels between that case and Trump
v. Hawaii. Like the displays in McCreary, the President issued two
subsequent executive orders within a few months “only as a litigating
position” to conceal a religious test to gain entry into the United States.58
The orders also violated the Free Exercise Clause, as explained in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.59 There, the Court identified a
religious gerrymander when an ordinance solely banned animal sacrifices,
which were performed as part of a religious ceremony.60 Similarly, the
Refugee Prioritization Program in EO-1 created a gerrymander too,
disfavoring Islamic refugee claimants while giving priority to refugee claims
filed by non-Muslims.
This Article discusses the following. Part I explains the effect of the
travel bans, the procedural history leading up to Trump v. Hawaii, and the
Court’s reasoning in this case. I conclude that courts should not use either
campaign nor presidential statements to interpret law, because they are less
reliable and legitimate than legislative history. Furthermore, Part II
concludes that the President’s statements are not needed to find the orders’
violations under the Religion Clauses. The text and structure of the
orders are enough. Thus, Part III disagrees with Trump v. Hawaii, and
contends that this case, like Korematsu, does not solely involve national
security matters; rather, it is an individual rights case that fails a strict
scrutiny analysis.

I. How Executive Orders Became Blowhorns: Procedural
History, Trump v. Hawaii, and the Unreliability of Campaign and
Presidential Statements.
A. Three Travel Bans in Nine Months

As previously mentioned, EO 1 banned all citizens from seven Muslim
majority countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—
from entering the country for 90 days.61 The administration also suspended
RAP for 120 days to allow the relevant agencies time “to determine what
additional procedures should be taken to ensure that that those approved for
refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the

57. Id. at 864.
58. See McCreary County, at 871.
59. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) [hereinafter Santeria].
60. Id. at 536 (Although the ordinance banned religious sacrifices, it included an exception
for killing animals for consumption.).
61. EO-1, supra note 32, at § 5.
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United States.” Notably, the order “prioritize[d] refugee claims made on
the basis of religious persecution, provided that the religion of the individual
is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”63 Within
one week, the District Court for the Western District of Washington issued
a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) blocking the administration from
enforcing the order nationwide.64 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit rejected the Government’s appeal to stay the injunction,
concluding that “[t]he Government has not shown that it is likely to succeed
on appeal,” and “not[ing] the serious nature of the allegations the States have
raised with respect to their religious discrimination claims.”65
Thirty-eight days later, President Trump revoked EO-1 and issued EO2. Significantly, EO-2 removed Sections 5(b) and 5(e) of EO 1, which gave
priority to claimants who were religious minorities in their nation of origin.66
Even though EO 2 expunged those sections, it defended them, positing that
the revoked sections did not intend to religiously discriminate:
[EO-1] did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against
members of any particular religion. While that order allowed for
prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious
minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation,
including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to
minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus
toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of
religious minorities—whoever they are and wherever they reside—to avail
themselves of [RAP].67
EO-2 strived to further vindicate EO-1, explaining that six out of the
seven countries targeted in EO-1 were selected because they were either state
sponsors of terrorism, compromised by terrorist groups, or contained combat
zones.68 However, the administration removed Iraq from the list because, as
per the order, it presented a “special case.”69 Although Iraq’s conflict with
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) impacted its ability to secure its
national borders and systematically identify fraudulent travel documents,
EO-2 indicated that Iraq must be treated differently because it maintains a
“close cooperative relationship” with the United States.70

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. § 5.
EO-1, supra note 32, at § 5(b).
Wash. v. Trump, No. C17-0141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017).
EO-2, supra note 38, at § 1(b)(iv).
Id.
Id. § 1(d).
Id.§ 1(g).
Id.
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Nevertheless, Judge Derrick K. Watson of the District Court for the
District of Hawaii issued a (“TRO”) based, in part, on President Trump’s
statements; the administration argued that the court should not examine the
“veiled psyche” and “secret motives” of government decisionmakers, and
should not engage in ‘‘judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of
hearts.”71 Judge Watson strongly disagreed. He said that “there is nothing
‘veiled’ about this press release: ‘Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.’”72 The Court
granted a partial stay of the TRO issued by Judge Watson, requiring that
those who have a “credible claim of bona fide relationship with a person or
entity in the U.S.,” will be exempt from the 90 day suspension.73 If such a
relationship is enough for the administration to be satisfied about the safety
of allowing such individuals into the country, perhaps their concerns are not
as serious as they claimed. EO-2 expired, however, before the Court could
take action.74
President Trump issued EO-3 on September 24, 2017.75 This order
developed an information sharing “baseline” for foreign governments’
capability and willingness to identify the identities and security risks of their
citizens who are seeking entry into the United States.76 The baseline
examined three areas: (1) the integrity of travel documents issued by the
foreign country, (2) the extent to which the foreign government discloses the
criminal history or links to terrorists groups of passengers traveling to the
U.S., and (3) the national security risk posed by the foreign government.77
Supposedly applying this calculus to every country on Earth, the President
removed Sudan from the list of designated countries; added Chad, North
Korea, and Venezuela; removed the expiration dates of the ban; and, added
a cap to the number of refugees allowed to enter the United States.78 On
October 17, 2017, Judge Watson granted another TRO.79 Instead of focusing
on the Establishment Clause, he focused on discrimination based on a
nationality: “EO-3 suffers from precisely the same maladies as its
predecessor: it lacks sufficient findings that the entry of more than 150
million nationals from six specified countries would be ‘detrimental to the
interests of the United States.’”80 For Judge Watson, the administration’s
71. Trump v. Haw., NO. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 34-35, https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3518057/Order.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404.
74. Id.
75. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
76. EO-3, supra note 44, at § 1(c).
77. Id. § 1(c)(i)-(iii).
78. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
79. Haw. v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1145 (D. Haw. 2017).
80. Id.

2 - ADSIDE MACROED 11-16-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2020]

12/12/2019 2:23 PM

IT’S A BLOWHORN NOT A DOG WHISTLE

279

“baseline” did not justify the order. However, the Ninth Circuit stayed Judge
Watson’s TRO, with the exception of allowing the entry of foreign nationals
with a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in this country.81
Satisfied with the language of the proclamation, the Court allowed the
proclamation to go into effect.82 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear Trump v. Hawaii.83
B. Trump v. Hawaii

Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis focused only on EO-3, the only order
remaining active at the time. He ignored E.O. 1, which the administration
revoked, and E.O. 2, which expired. This cramped view divorces the review
of EO-3 from Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which requires reviewing
courts to place the order within its legal context. It had significant context,
considering that it was the third issued in less than nine months, and all of
them were responses to national injunctions.84 The Court’s myopic approach
permitted the administration to conceal its religious motives, which allowed
the Trump v. Hawaii Court to rest its ruling on the INA’s broad, discretionary
language. That Act renders an undocumented person inadmissible to the
United States for multiple reasons.85 The decision here turned on 8 U.S.C.
Section 1182(f). That statute delegates broad authority to the President to
suspend entry of an entire group of undocumented people if he considers it
necessary. Section 1182(f) provides that:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any [undocumented
people] or of any class of [undocumented people] into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he
may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem
necessary, suspend the entry of all [undocumented people] or any
class of [undocumented people] as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or
impose on the entry of . . . any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate.86
The Chief Justice found that every statutory clause supported the notion
of presidential deference. First, he reasoned that § 1182(f)’s only
requirement for the president to prohibit entry is for him to “find[]” that
admissibility of an undocumented person “would be detrimental to the
81. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406.
82. Id.
83. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923.
84. See infra discussion on McCreary, Part II. A.
85. Trump v. Hawaii. at 2407. Example reasons are participation in genocide, use of child
soldiers, and terrorist activities.
86. Id. at 2408.
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interests of the United States.” In fact, the clause does not impose any set
of guidelines for the President to follow when making this determination.
Thus, the information sharing baseline used to make the finding at issue was
more than sufficient.88 Second, he found that the term “suspend” denoted
deference too, as the statute placed no limitation on the duration of such
suspension.89 The suspension may last “for such period as [the President]
shall deem necessary.”90 Lastly, this suspension may be applied to “any class
of [undocumented people].”91 The term “class” is undefined, and thus broad
enough to encompass a class of undocumented people “linked by
nationality.”92
This decision has two profound consequences, but the logic behind
each, contradicts the other. As stated, the majority Opinion affirmed broad
congressional delegation of presidential authority in the area of immigration
policy.93 However, the Court also overturned Korematsu, a case which
supported such broad executive discretion.94 The Majority made a
questionable distinction between the different executive actions in
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii: the action in the former was taken “solely
and explicitly on the basis of” anti-group sentiment, but the action in the
latter was based on legitimate grounds.95 Justice Sotomayor strongly
disagreed. In her Dissenting Opinion, she pointed to President Trump’s
campaign statements regarding Islam as evidence of religious animus.96
While Chief Justice Roberts nodded to the existence of the President’s
anti-Muslim statements, he concluded that they carried no interpretative
weight.97 He described EO-3 as a “directive, neutral on its face, addressing
a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”98 He argued that such
a ban was facially neutral, and that merely “denying certain foreign nationals
the privilege of admission” could not be compared to Korematsu’s forcible
relocation of American citizens based on race.99 Satisfied with the facially
neutral order, Chief Justice Roberts concluded his investigation. Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent furiously rejected the Court’s circumscribed approach.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 2408-09.
Trump v. Hawaii. at 2409.
Id. at 2409-10.
Id. at 2410.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2407-10.
Trump v. Hawaii. at 2447-48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2423.
Id. at 2435-39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
Id.
Id. at 2423.
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She criticized EO-3 as “motivated by anti-Muslim animus.” She said that
the Court’s reasoning in Trump v. Hawaii had “stark parallels” to Korematsu;
the travel ban, like the exclusion order, was based on an “ill-defined national
security threat” to justify a sweeping policy.101 She pointed to at least 20 of
President Trump’s campaign statements, as well as various press releases
and interviews, as strong evidence that the order was based on animus
towards Muslims.102 Although I agree that the orders are motivated by antiMuslim animus, I need not examine the President’s comments to find it. It
is tempting to view this President’s statements in a vacuum. The issue is not
whether this President’s prior statements should be admitted, but whether
any presidential statements should be considered fair game when interpreting
the law. Such statements present a jurisprudential problem when employed
as a tool for interpretation.
C. Presidential Statements Are Worse Than Legislative History

Presidential statements are untenable as interpretive tools. This
becomes apparent when one compares informal statements by the
Commander-in-Chief to the more traditional theory of statutory
interpretation, legislative history. Scholars and jurists have questioned the
latter’s reliability, in part because actors frequently manipulate legislative
history to reflect their interests.103 Lobbyists create legislative history to
deceitfully make Congress “appear to embrace their particular view” of a
law, and Congress engages in the “post-enactment creation of ‘legislative
history’” by inserting their views into the Congressional Record after
enacting a law.104 Should jurists overemphasize these questionable sources,
they give effect to text and presumed consequences never written into law.
This damages the legitimacy of the democratic process of lawmaking.
However, Congress’ size somewhat mitigates the problem of manipulation.
Congress consists of 535 members, meaning that groups with competing
interests engage in the creation of legislative history.105 Consequently, it is
difficult for any one group to manipulate legislative history into a single,
coherent message.106
100. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
101. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2447.
102. Id. at 2435-39.
103. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.
371, 377 (1987).
104. Id.
105. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind
as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.”).
106. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is at
best dangerous to assume that all the necessary participants in the law-enactment process are acting
upon the same unexpressed assumptions.”).
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In contrast, the unitary executive theory holds that the President can
manipulate the history of the Executive Branch with ease.107 The President
controls a vast communications apparatus. He can communicate a unified
message through “political storytelling, civic interpretation, persuasion, and
mobilization” because there are no competing sources of power within the
Executive Branch.108 Moreover, the White House employs numerous
surrogates to spread the President’s message in the media. The White House
Office of Communications, for example, crafts executive statements to
“strategically . . . advance the agenda of the President.”109 The Office of
Digital Strategy uses social media to “amplify the President’s message.”110
Finally, the White House Press Secretary is the “official spokesperson” for
the President and provides official “comment[s] and response[s] to events
and criticism” on his behalf.111 Finally, the President has his Twitter account.
With nearly 65 million followers—about one fifth of the country—the
Presidential Twitter account is a powerful communications tool. A
presidential tweet can become instant news, influencing the national
conversation—just ask poor Mitt Romney.112 Should the President desire to
manipulate his statements, or the interpretation of past ones, the White House
has substantial resources to do so. The Trump administration has made
substantial use of these resources to recast the travel bans as a homeland
security issue unaffected by anti-Muslim bias.113 Some opinion polls suggest
107. Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 71, 76 (2017).
108. Shaw, supra note 107
109. See White House Internship Program, Presidential Departments, WHITEHOUSE.gov (last
visited Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/get-involved/internships/presidential-depart
ments/ (The White House Internship Program website gives a short description of each department
within the White House.).
110. Id.
111. Martha Joynt Kumar, The Office of the Press Secretary, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 296,
296 (2001).
112. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180487139546546182.
113. The Trump Communication Team has repeatedly insisted that EO-1 targeted countries
based on national security concerns and not religion. Before he took office, his team began to
downplay his past comments. In a December 2016 interview with CNN, White House Aide
Kellyanne Conway said that people who referred to proposed policy as a Muslim ban were ignoring
the fact that he “talked about countries where we know that they’ve got a higher propensity of
training and exporting terrorists . . . .” Gregory King, Conway: Trump Will Not Pursue
Immigration Ban Based Solely On Religion, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 10:22 AM), https://www.
cnn.com/2016/12/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-donald-trump-muslim-ban/ index.html. The day
after President Trump signed EO-1, his Cybersecurity Advisor Rudolph Giuliani told an
interviewer that the ban was “not based on religion” but “places where there [is] substantial
evidence that people are sending terrorists in the country.” Amy B Wang, Trump Asked For A
‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says - And Ordered A Commission To Do it ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan.
29, 2017, 3:32 PM), https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-askedfor-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/. Trump’s surrogates
continued to insist that the policy was based on national security concerns and not religious bias
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that the President’s efforts have been largely successful among voters. So
the White House Communications apparatus can serve as a smokescreen
covering the executive’s true intent.
Despite these problems, proponents of using presidential and campaign
statements argue that executive intent is easier to discover than legislative
intent. Since the President is a single person, investigating his or her
intentions requires a smaller universe of information; the press statements,
speeches, and signing statements, where the President announces his or her
legal interpretations.115 In fact, the President often issues signing statements
to announce the personal intent not to enforce some statutory provisions in
ways that may infringe on his constitutional powers.116 Anyone trying to
interpret legislative history, on the other hand, must consult the drafts, floor
statements, and voluminous committee reports.117 Such an inquiry may be a
fool’s errand; representatives have a myriad of motives for voting for a law
with competing interpretations.118 In contrast, the unitary executive, has
but one motive to discover and thus only that person can shed light on

throughout the legal proceedings against it, although the President Trump refused to disavow his
prior statements regarding a Muslim ban. Solicitor General Noel Francisco said that President
Trump “has made crystal-clear that Muslims in this country are great Americans and there are
many, many Muslim countries who love this country, and he has praised Islam as one of the great
countries [sic] of the world.” Christopher Cadelago, Josh Gerstein and Louis Nelson, Being Trump
Means Never Having To Say You’re Sorry, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.
politico.com/story/2018/04/30/trump-muslim-ban-no-apologies-560287. Similarly, White House
Press Secretary Sarah Sanders stated in a 2018 press conference that the Executive Orders were
focused on security, and stressed that it was “limited to a small number of countries” and allowed
citizens from “a lot of Muslim-majority countries” to continue “to travel to and from the United
States . . . .” Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, WHITEHOUSE.GOV. (Apr. 25, 2018,
2:19 PM), https://www.white house.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarahsande rs-042518/.
114. 55% Agree Trump’s Travel Ban Targets Terrorists, Not Muslims, RASMUSSEN REPORTS:
POLITICS (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_po
litics/april_2018/55_agree_trump_s_travel_ban_targets_terrorists_not_muslims; Steven Shepard,
Poll: Majority of Voters Back Trump Travel Ban, POLITICO (July 5, 2017, 5:58 AM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/trump-travel-ban-poll-voters-240215; CNN ORC INT’L POLL
7 (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/03/re l2a.-.trump.pdf
(reporting that the public was split on the travel bans with 53% opposed, and 47% in favor).
115. See FEDERALIST PAPER No. 10, supra note 16.
116. For example, when President Barack Obama signed the National Defense Authorization
Act he indicated that he would not abide by Section 1032 and Section 1034, which related to
Guantanamo detainee transferrers in situations where he determined they would violate the
Constitution. Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States, Statement by the
President on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/23/statement-president-signing-n
ational-defense-authorization-act-fiscal.
117. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
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119

statutory meaning.
The interpretative process is made even easier with
an executive order, some say, since it is purely an executive action.
Congress is, thus, irrelevant.
Nevertheless, presidential statements are less constitutionally
legitimate than legislative history. While the President and Congress both
possess law-making authority, they have different roles in that process. The
Constitution vests Congress with “all” legislative power, which includes the
power to write laws.120 Thus, it makes sense to consult the drafters of a law
to determine its meaning.121 The President does not write law. The
Constitution limits the President’s powers to signing, vetoing, and enforcing
laws.122 Neither legislative history nor presidential statements, however,
pass through the process of bicameralism and presentment. Consequently,
they carry no legal force.123 Therefore, judges should use neither legislative
history nor presidential statements for interpretative purposes. If presidential
statements do not carry legal weight, surely mere campaign statements do
not. Campaign statements, like legislative history, are “susceptible to
multiple interpretations, depending on the outlook of the recipient.” Their
use would allow courts to adopt whichever interpretation “best supports its
desired conclusion.”124 In fact, there is no principled way to distinguish
between statements to use versus discard. Take the following thought
experiment as an example.
Suppose a presidential candidate says, “I despise the South. I wish
Sherman had finished the job and burnt it all down!” He is elected President.
After his inauguration, he orders the small business administration to
deprioritize loan requests from states which joined the Confederacy. The
order is challenged on Due Process grounds. Plaintiffs argue that the order
does not provide adequate process to Southern applicants, and point to his
earlier campaign statement as evidence. During litigation, the President
addresses the nation from the Oval Office and states, “I love the South, and
they’re great businesspeople!” If presidential or campaign statements are

119. Kathryn Marie Dessayer, The First Word: The President’s Place in “Legislative
History”, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 411(1990) (When the President vetoes a bill, his reason for doing
so is entered into the congressional record. If he signs a later version with his recommended
changes, his interpretation arguably should be an important factor interpreting it.).
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
121. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA REV. L. 621, 686 (1990) (arguing
that if there is more than one plausible meaning, consulting legislative history can be useful for
determining which one Congress intended).
122. William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND.
L.J. 699, 709-10. (1991).
123. Starr, supra note 95, at 377; Thompson, 484 U.S. at 191-92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 264 (2018) (Niemeyer, J.,
dissenting).
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used to interpret executive orders, then which statement should a judge
consider in this case? They conflict with each other.
At best, these statements are expressions of developing ideas and
policies that are “explained, modified, retracted, and amplified” as campaign
events progress and administrations mature.125 At worst, perhaps the Oval
Office comments were in response to litigation and should be ignored. Or,
as a cynical approach, both statements have no meaning at all. A presidential
candidate can express a policy position during a campaign with no intention
to implement that policy once elected into office. A politician breaking
campaign promises—perish the thought!
While Chief Justice Roberts was correct to not consider extrinsic
statements to interpret the order, his overall conclusion was fundamentally
flawed for two reasons. First, the order was not facially neutral.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires that the reviewed text be
contextualized, and the order was not reviewed in context. Second, he
forgets that the Constitution trumps all statutes. Section 1182(f) does not
empower the President to base his findings that entry of a call of
undocumented people would harm the nation on the basis of unconstitutional
grounds, such as an alien’s Islamic faith. When viewed in context, EO-3
violates the Religion Clauses. McCreary and the Santeria case are
instructive here.

II. Religion Clause Principles: No Shams, No Gerrymanders
A. Three Displays, Three Orders: How McCreary and Trump v. Hawaii
Are Similar

In McCreary, the Court saw through governmental attempts to hide
religious motivations of an action. It reviewed several displays which a
Kentucky county placed in their courthouses. At first, each county had goldframed copies of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments
hanging visibly in the hallway.126 After the ACLU sued the counties, they
erected a second display, expanding the Ten Commandments display to
include eight other framed documents that had a religious theme.127 Some
of the documents included the “endowed by their Creator” passage from the
Declaration of Independence and the national motto, “In God We Trust.”128
Unpersuaded, the District Court ordered the display be removed.129 In
response, the courthouses hired new counsel and hung nine framed

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

International Refugee, 883 F.3d at 264.
International Refugee, 883 F.3d at 851-52.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 854.
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documents of equal size, one of them setting out the Ten Commandments,
the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the
lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National
Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady
Justice.130 The collection entitled “The Foundations of American Law and
Government Display” has each document with a statement about its
historical and legal significance.131 McCreary held that their final display
(along with the others) violated the Establishment Clause. The original
religious motive was still there, even after the counties changed their displays
three times in one year.132 The counties only changed the display to improve
their litigation position.133 This is like another, nobler Kentucky practice,
that of putting a little water in one’s bourbon; It may go down smoother, but
the liquor is still there! Here, the “bourbon” was the religious content, and
the diluting “water” were the neutral documents.
McCreary found that Establishment Clause analysis examines if
government has a “secular purpose.” The Court found that this purpose
cannot be secondary to a religious one; the secular purpose must be genuine
and not a sham.134 To determine whether the government’s purpose is valid,
an interpreter can examine evolving texts in light of the circumstances.
Legislative statements are not needed for this analysis: “[P]urpose needs to
be taken seriously under the Establishment Clause and needs to be
understood in light of context; an implausible claim that governmental
purpose has changed should not carry the day in a court of law any more than
in a head with common sense.”135 The fact that the courthouses changed the
display twice did not conceal religious motives in the solo Ten
Commandments display, particularly when the changes were enacted in
response to a year-long litigation.
There are stark parallels between three religious displays in McCreary
and the three travel ban orders in Trump v. Hawaii. Like the courthouses in
McCreary, President Trump changed the order’s text to conceal a religious
motive in response to litigation.136 In January 2017, E.O. 1 imposed a 90day suspension of entry of aliens from covered seven countries, and
prioritized religious-based refugee claims if an alien is a religious minority
in the covered nation.137 But this order, like the display in McCreary, was
struck by lower courts, who found that it violated the Establishment
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
International Refugee, 883 F.3d at 855.
545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005).
Id. at 864.
Id. at 874.
See 545 U.S. at 871.
E.O. 1 § 1(c).
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Clause.
Two months later, E.O.2 removed language prioritizing
religious minorities in the refugee program. E.O. 2 lasted only six months
but the District Courts for Maryland and Hawaii imposed nationwide
injunctions against the order, which the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld.139
Similar to McCreary, the travel ban’s national security purpose is a
sham because substantial alterations to the text were ordered for litigation
purposes.140 They were only inserted into the text to cover up the President’s
intention to ban Muslims. President Trump revoked E.O. 1 when the Ninth
Circuit rejected the Executive’s appeal to seek an emergency stay to allow
the order to go into effect.141 In fact, changes to the executive orders were
as insincere, if not more so, than the display changes. The three displays
were posted within only one year, whereas the President issued three separate
travel bans in a shocking nine months.142 If Trump v. Hawaii followed
McCreary, it would have concluded that “in light of the context” the
“implausible claim” that governmental purpose to impose a Muslim ban
suddenly changed within 38 days after the President revoked E.O.1 “should
not carry the day in a court of law any more than in a head with common
sense.”143 Following McCreary, the purpose inquiry does not need to consult
presidential or campaign statements. An interpreter only needs to examine
text changes in response to litigation to determine intent. Here, alterations
to the text, not statements, remain the touchstone.
B. How The Orders Created a Religious Gerrymander

When EO-1 can no longer hide behind the facially neutral EO-3, its Free
Exercise violation becomes apparent. In the Santeria case, the Court struck
down animal cruelty ordinances for discriminating against the Santeria
religion; respondents criminalized ritualistic animal sacrificing (not for food
consumption), yet exempted animal killing, including kosher butchering:
“The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are
prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is proscribed because it occurs
during a ritual or ceremony and its primary purpose is to make an offering to
the orishas, not food consumption.”144 Here, the Free Exercise analysis did

138. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 2018);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2018).
139. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018).
140. Id.
141. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F. 3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017).
142. The President signed E.O.1 on January 27, 2017, and signed E.O. 3 on September 24,
2017.
143. Id. at 874.
144. Santeria, 508 U.S. at 536.
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not need to investigate the ordinance’s legislative history.
Rather, the
ordinance’s text and structure revealed the gerrymander, since Santeria
sacrifice did not permit food consumption. Thus, the city designed the
ordinance to target that faith.
Like the animal sacrifice ordinances, Section 5 of EO-1 created a
Christian or non-Muslim gerrymander in violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. Undoubtedly, Trump targeted Muslim-majority countries in EO-1,
where he declared in Section 3(c):
I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into
the United States of [undocumented people] from [Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen] would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the
United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons
for 90 days from the date of this order.146
Section 5(a) suspended the refugee program worldwide for 120 days.147
Like the kosher butchering exemption in the Santeria case, Section 5(e) is
an explicit exemption carved out along religious lines:
Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United
States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but
only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals
as refugees is in the national interest—including when the person is
a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious
persecution . . . .148

145. Id. at 534-36.
146. EO-1, supra note 32.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added); Santeria, 508 U.S. at 535-36 (“[A]lmost the only conduct subject
to[the] Ordinances . . . is the religious exercise of Santeria church members. The texts show that
they were drafted in tandem to achieve this result. We begin with Ordinance 87-71. It prohibits
the sacrifice of animals, but defines sacrifice as “to unnecessarily kill . . . an animal in a public or
private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.” The definition
excludes almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifice, and the primary purpose
requirement narrows the proscribed category even further, in particular by exempting kosher
slaughter . . . . It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for our conclusion that Santeria
alone was the exclusive legislative concern.”). Id. at 536 (“The ordinance exempts, however, “any
licensed [food] establishment” with regard to “any animals which are specifically raised for food
purposes,” if the activity is permitted by zoning and other laws. This exception, too, seems intended
to cover kosher slaughter.”).
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This section strikes at the sincerity of the President’s national security
justifications. What about religious minorities from any country makes them
safer to admit then those in the majority? Section 5(b) bolsters the Section
5(e) exemption favoring non-Muslim refugee claims upon the resumption of
the refugee program. In other words, the religious gerrymander would be a
permanent feature of the program, because the administration would
“prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religiousbased persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority
religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”149 While the words
“Islam” and “Muslim” are not explicitly mentioned, the order structurally
disfavors Muslim refugee claims since these applicants are not individuals
from a minority religion in the seven named countries. The Trump
administration’s supposed rebuttal to this point can be found in Section
1(b)(iv) of EO-2, which explained that EO-1 did not discriminate against
refugee claims on a religious basis: “While that order allowed for
prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious
minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation,
including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to
minority sects within a religion.”150 The first claim of the Trump
administration—that the priority applied to refugees from every nation,
including those in which Islam is a minority religion—is irrelevant because
EO-1 exclusively applied to Muslim-majority countries.151 The second
claim—that the exemption reached minority sects within a religion—
requires more careful consideration. Theoretically, Shia Muslims from Iraq
and Syria and Sunni Muslims from Iran would receive priority status just as
Christian applicants in the targeted countries.152 However, this argument is
unpersuasive for two reasons.
The contention that Sections 5(b) and 5(e) of EO-1 include minorities
within Islam defies plain English. The original executive order promised to
“prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religiousbased persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority
religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”153 In effect, this would
protect Christians, who are the minority religion in each of the predominantly
Muslim countries listed on the travel ban.154 But Sunni and Shia Muslims
are different sects within the same religion—each makes up the majority

149. EO-1, supra note 32 (emphasis added).
150. EO-2, supra note 38.
151. EO-1, supra note 32.
152. EO-2, supra note 38.
153. EO-1, supra note 32 (emphasis added).
154. See generally WORLD POPULATION REVIEW: SUNNI COUNTRIES (Sept. 27, 2019), http://
worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sunni-countries/.
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religion in the banned countries.
In a country like Iraq, where the Sunni
minority faces persecution similar to the Christian minority, only the
Christian minority has a valid claim for refugee status under the order’s
minority religion exemption. The persecuted Shia are lumped in as a
member of the majority religion, albeit a minority member. The orders do
not recognize the basic distinctions between the terms “religion” and “sect;”
however, the distinction between sect and religion makes no difference under
the Establishment Clause. It ought to be noted that the Trump
Administration’s attempts to dissemble about what the first order did is
exactly the sort of post-hoc manipulation of the record which makes the use
Presidential statements untenable for interpretive purposes.
In Larson v. Valente, the Court struck down a Minnesota statute
exempting religious organizations from certain registration and reporting
requirements if the organizations received more than 50% of their
contributions from members because, “[t]he clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.”156 So, according to the Trump administration’s own
rationale, the refugee prioritization program violates the Establishment
Clause; it favored Shia Muslim refugees over Sunni Muslim refugees.157 Six
of the seven countries in EO-1 are Sunni-majority, while only one—Iran—
is predominantly Shia.158 Therefore, the unavoidable effect of the
administration’s policy is that Sunni refugees was largely disfavored from
entry into the United States to the benefit of Shia refugees. This government
preference toward a specific religious sect is the kind of religious
discrimination that left “the newly independent States . . . powerless to tax
their citizens for the support of a denomination to which they did not
belong . . . .
[T]his reasoning led to the abolition of most [state
denominations] by the 1780s, and led ultimately to the inclusion of
the Establishment Clause . . . in 1791.159 Finally, if this prioritization did not
discriminate on a religious basis, then it raises the question as to why EO-2
removed language that prioritized claims of individuals from the minority
religion in their country of origin. EO-2 attempted to “have its cake and eat
155. Id. Sect, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.c
om/dictionary/sect (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (The term “sect” is defined as “a religious group that
is a smaller part of a larger group and whose members all share similar beliefs.”).
156. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). “Denomination” and “sect” can be used
interchangeably. Denomination, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/denomination (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (defines denomination as “a religious
group whose beliefs differ in some ways from other groups in the same religion”); thus, it is
similarly defined as “sect.” In other words, denomination and sect mean sub-groups with similar
beliefs in the same religion.
157. See EO-2, supra note 38.
158. See generally WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, supra note 143.
159. Larson, 486 U.S. at 244-45.
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it too” by refuting an intent to discriminate while revoking the prioritization
program. But the damage had already been done.
Chief Justice Roberts concluded, however, that these cases are
irrelevant, because “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a
‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.’”160 The next section
explains that Trump v. Hawaii is not solely a national security case where
the President receives deference; rather, it is an individual rights case that
should have been placed in the crosshairs of strict scrutiny.161

III. Why President Trump’s Travel Bans Should Not Receive
Deference
A. Presidents Receive Deference in Foreign Policy Matters

In Article II, the Framers vested “the executive power” in one President
of the United States.162 This design was implemented to remedy the defects
of the Articles of Confederation, which provided for a unicameral
Congress.163 The Founders concluded that the Articles were weak in its
administration of the law.164 A government created by the Articles stands in
stark contrast to a unitary executive. Hamilton argued that a plural executive
or multiple Presidents would create “mischiefs” and “dissension” like those

160. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 241.
161. Some may argue that the Court could have invalidated the travel bans under other theories
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor argued whether that the orders violated the
animus principle announced in Romer v. Evans. Trump v. Haw. 138 U.S. at 2442 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). Perhaps, it could be argued that the orders denied Muslims “equal dignity” under the
law. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
recognizes same-sex marriage). Neither theory is necessary in this case, however. The Free
Exercise Clause is designed to ferret out religious-based discrimination sponsored by the
government. See Santeria. But the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned with broad-group based
discrimination, such as race, national origin, and alienage. Gender is given intermediate scrutiny
status and it appears that the Court extended protections on basis of sexual orientation. Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment that denied protected
status to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause); U.S. v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. With
emerging theories like animus and even equal dignity in Romer and Obergefell, the Fourteenth
Amendment still has room to include new groups. Thus, it is not necessary to bleed these doctrines
and create confusion. Free Exercise has developed its own rules and it is adequate to handle these
sorts of cases. Santeria, 508 U.S. at 532 (explaining that the court uses strict scrutiny in Free
Exercise cases). As I will prove, strict scrutiny is sufficient to resolve Trump v. Hawaii.
162. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
163. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 994-99
(1993).
164. Id.
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which occurred between the Roman Consuls.
Accordingly, the Framers
rejected a proposal to select three executives. They feared divisions on
public policy, particularly in military affairs.166 A unitary executive, on the
other hand, can act unilaterally in response to emergencies with considerable
“energy” and “dispatch.”167 As a multimember body governed by rules and
procedures, Congress is a slow-moving institution designed to produce more
calculated and possibly better legislation.168 While deliberation may be a
virtue in domestic policy, it is a detriment in foreign affairs. As the attack
on Pearl Harbor and the September 11 attacks demonstrate, foreign crises
may occur at any time, and require a rapid response. Thus, the President is
the only actor who “can respond to a looming threat or emergency.”169 This
is why Hamilton, in Federalist No. 70, identified an energetic executive as
essential to repelling foreign invasions and thus is “the bulwark of national
security.”170
To this end, Article II grants the President broad authority as the
Commander-in-Chief.171 Presidents have regularly used this authority to act
unilaterally during wars and national emergencies, and have received
deference from Congress in doing so. For example, President Abraham
Lincoln suspended habeas corpus, seized railroads and issued the
Emancipation Proclamation without statutory authorization.172
He
“consistently maintained” that his role as Commander-in-Chief authorized
these bold actions.173 President Lincoln eventually sought and received
legislative authorization for the presidential proclamation and executive
order because of judicial criticism, yet Congress never insinuated that
Lincoln had acted unconstitutionally.174 Likewise, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt routinely seized munition plants to avoid closures during World
War II.175 In 1943, Congress enacted the War Labor Disputes Act to provide
a statutory basis for President Roosevelt’s seizures.176 It recognized,
however, that he “already had the necessary power” to seize.177 This robust
view of presidential power continued in the post-World War II era.
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
166. Prakash, supra note 152, at 999.
167. Hamilton, supra note 154.
168. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 812, 826 (2013).
169. Id. at 827.
170. Hamilton, supra note 154.
171. See Madison, supra note 16, at §1.
172. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 157, at 819-21.
173. Id. at 819.
174. Id. at 820.
175. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 695-97 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting).
176. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 697.
177. Id.
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More recently, President George W. Bush argued in favor of a robust
executive with plenary war powers.178 He maintained that “no explicit
congressional authorization” was needed to indefinitely detain suspected
terrorists as “enemy combatants.”179 Congress displayed a similar
understanding of presidential power in the Authorization for Use of Military
Force of 2001 (“AUMF”).180 In its preamble, the AUMF declares that the
Constitution empowers the President to act “to deter and prevent” terrorist
attacks against the United States.181 Section 2 then grants broad presidential
power to combat international terrorism, authorizing the President to use “all
necessary and appropriate force” to respond to future terrorist attacks.182 The
statute does not define “force.” Nor does it specify the targets of that force.183
Congress delegated authority to the President to decide when force is
“necessary and appropriate,” and how to apply that force on any person,
organization, or nations “he determines” can prevent future terrorist
activity.184 As these examples show, unilateral Presidential action in national
security affairs is consistent with this nation’s historical practices.
The Court instructs deference to the President in immigration matters
because they are tied to national security and foreign policy issues.185 In
Arizona v. United States, they found that immigration enforcement requires
“discretionary decisions” that “bear on [the United States’] international
relations” because the President must “confer and communicate” with other
nations regarding the presence, entry, and removal of their citizens.186
Trump v. Hawaii’s Section 1182(f) shows that Congress defers to the
President in this area, too. It has delegated vast discretion to the President to
determine when a noncitizen can enter the United States.187 Even if the
courts should defer to the President in foreign affairs, deference was not
warranted in Trump v. Hawaii. That case does not solely involve national
security matters.

178. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
179. Id.
180. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001)
[hereinafter “AUMF”].
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally id.
184. Id.
185. Ariz. v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 395-96 (2012). “The Government of the United States has
broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and . . . Immigration policy can affect . . .
diplomatic relations for the entire nation . . .”
186. Id. “Citizens” here means citizens of the foreign countries.
187. See generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 157, at 851-52.
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B. Trump v. Hawaii is not Solely a National Security Case

Comparing Trump v. Hawaii to modern detention cases reveal that it is
not the ordinary national security case—if it even should be described as
such. In the detention cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004),
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008), the petitioners challenged the President’s authority to detain
them as “enemy combatants” during an armed conflict. Therefore, these
cases directly implicated the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief.
However, Trump v. Hawaii, like Korematsu, is a hybrid case involving an
executive order which targets a constitutionally protected class where
national security is only superficially related to the case. A comparison to
Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene highlights these differences.
In Hamdi, the petitioner was an American citizen that the U.S. military
detained as an “enemy combatant” at Guantanamo Bay detention camp
(“Guantanamo Bay”). Hamdi argued that the government violated his due
process rights because it prevented him from challenging his detention; the
government responded that the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief, and
empowered him to detain anyone fighting against the U.S. without due
process until the cessation of hostilities to “prevent captured individuals
from returning to the field of battle.”188 The Court employed the Mathews
v. Eldridge balancing test to weigh Hamdi’s “private interest” in due process
against the government’s “asserted interest” in preventing enemy forces
from returning to the battlefield.189 Ultimately, the Court held that the
government violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments because the risk of an erroneous detention was high since
Hamdi could not challenge his status detention or designation as an “enemy
combatant.”190
In Hamdan, the petitioner was a Yemeni national detained at the
Guantanamo Bay detention camp whom the federal government tried for
“conspiracy ‘to commit . . . offenses triable by military commission.’”191
Hamdan argued that the Bush administration’s military commissions tried
detainees in a manner violating Common Article 3 of the Geneva

188. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528 (“Hamdi emphasizes that this Court consistently has recognized
that an individual challenging his detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without
recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to determine whether the Executive’s asserted
justifications for that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law.”); see also id. at 518.
189. Id. at 529-32 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976)).
190. Id. at 535; see also id. at 532 (“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker.”).
191. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
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Conventions. The government contended that Common Article 3 did not
apply as the conflict with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was not a “conflict not
of an international character.”193 The Court disagreed, finding that the
Convention’s official commentaries instructed parties to give Common
Article 3 an application that is ‘‘as wide as possible.”194 Thus, the process
afforded to Hamdan failed to grant the judicial protections which Geneva
requires be given to enemy combatants.
In Boumediene, the petitioner, again a foreign national detained at
Guantanamo Bay, asserted that the government deprived him of the
constitutional right to habeas corpus by failing to provide him a “meaningful
opportunity” to challenge his detention.195 President George W. Bush
maintained that the Suspension Clause did not extend to the individuals
detained at Guantanamo Bay because Cuba held de jure political jurisdiction
there.196 However, the Boumediene Court held that the Suspension Clause
“has full effect at Guantanamo Bay” because the United States exercised de
facto control over the territory.197 Furthermore, it held that the process
Congress provided to detainees was not “an adequate substitute for the writ
of habeas corpus” because it did not provide detainees sufficient opportunity
to challenge their imprisonment or enable a court to “order the conditional
release of an individual unlawfully detained.”198
These detention cases are different from Trump v. Hawaii. The issues
presented there were directly related to the President’s role as Commanderin-Chief. All three petitioners were enemy combatants who posed serious
risks to national security. If not detained, they would have continued to fight
the United States on the battlefield. This is evident from the circumstances
of their capture. For example, the government asserted that the Northern
Alliance captured Hamdi after a “battle with the Taliban.”199 Hamdi was
holding an assault rifle when he surrendered.200 The government inferred
from this evidence that Hamdi was fighting as part of the Taliban, and thus

192. Hamdan 548 U.S. at 571.
193. Id. at 630. Common Article 3 only applies in conflicts of an international character. hldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/466097d7a301f8c4c12
563cd00424e2b. See commentary.
194. Id. at 631.
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 799 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289,
302 (2001)) (internal quotation marks ommitted).
196. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753 (“[T]he [G]overnment says the Suspension Cause affords
petitioners no rights because the United States does not claim sovereignty over the place of
detention.”).
197. Id. at 770-71 (“The detainees . . . are held in a territory that, while technically not part of
the United States, is under the complete and total control of our Government.”).
198. Id. at 771, 779.
199. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513.
200. Id.
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posed a national security threat.
This inference justified his indefinite
detention under the President’s plenary war powers. In contrast, the order
reviewed in Trump v. Hawaii does not involve enemy combatants detained
on the battlefield. It involves “ordinary” men, women, and children who
have not attacked the United States.202 The order says that individuals pose
a security threat not because of their own actions, but rather because of their
religious affiliations. Thus, Trump v. Hawaii’s national security issues
appear to be secondary to discrimination claims—just like in Korematsu.
Both Trump v. Hawaii and Korematsu involved allegations of bigotry
against constitutionally protected classes, implicating the First and
Fourteenth Amendments respectively. In both cases, the national security
claims are secondary to the group-based discrimination claims. There is no
evidence that an “[undocumented person] or class of [undocumented
people]” from the covered nations in the travel bans are planning to attack
the United States as occurred at Pearl Harbor or on September 11—or that
being from those places made them more of a threat than someone from
another country.203 Similarly, concerns of foreign espionage and invasion
were superficial in Korematsu. The race-based exclusion of Japanese
Americans rested on the abstract assertions that the military lacked adequate
time to separate the loyal from the disloyal.204 Since the Court held that strict
scrutiny applied in Korematsu, it should have applied to Trump v. Hawaii as
well.205 Doing so now reveals the racial animus involved in the exclusion
order.
C. The Travel Bans Do Not Survive Strict Scrutiny

Courts apply strict scrutiny when a government action infringes on a
fundamental right or discriminates based on a “suspect classification,”
including race and religion.206 In these cases, courts should uphold the
government’s action only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.207 Narrow tailoring requires that an action not be overinclusive or
underinclusive.208 Government action is overinclusive if it “disadvantages
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 513-517.
If they had, they would already be banned from the country per the INA’s section 1182(f).
Alex Nowrasteh, New Government Terrorism Report Provides Little Useful Information,
CATO INSTITUTE (Jan. 16, 2018) (finding that American citizens were responsible for 78% of
deaths in terrorism attacks on U.S. soil).
204. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (“It was because we could not reject the finding of the
military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal
from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group.”).
205. Id. at 216.
206. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007).
207. Id. at 1316.
208. Adam Winker, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802-06 (2006).
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some people who do not . . . threaten the state’s interest.” The Korematsu
Court readily admitted that “most” of the relocated Japanese “were loyal to
[the United States].”210 So it was overinclusive; it treated loyal Americans
as harshly as the disloyal. Government action is underinclusive when it
“fails to regulate activities that pose” the same threat to the purported interest
as the regulated conduct.211 On this point, Korematsu fails by its own logic.
The nation was also at war with Germany and Italy during World War II.
Revealingly, the government did not relocate either Germans or Italians, and
conducted “investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the
disloyal” among them.212 This is important because such fact-finding might
have proven that Japanese Americans were loyal, yet they were denied that
opportunity because of a supposed military imperative.213 From the
government’s logic, that imperative existed with respect to Germans and
Italians as well. Those groups were not denied the opportunity to prove their
loyalty. Therefore, the relocation order was both underinclusive and
overinclusive.214 Similarly, the travel bans present no evidence of a real
national security threat or that those barred from entry are detrimental to the
United States. As the next section will show, the order is both overinclusive
and underinclusive, revealing that the claimed national security interests are
shams exposing anti-Muslim sentiments.215 When analyzed this way,
campaign statements are not needed. Rather, the text and structure of the
order are enough to reveal the constitutional violations.
I now apply strict scrutiny to the orders in Trump v. Hawaii. The
compelling state interest is stated in the titles of the respective orders. For
example, EO-1 is aimed to “[p]rotect[] the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States.”216 In the abstract, protecting the country from
foreign terrorism is a compelling interest; however, narrow tailoring requires
that the order precisely achieves its specific goal in a manner least restrictive
to civil liberties.217 As previously discussed, a reviewing court should
inquire into whether the orders were overinclusive or underinclusive.218 The
bans are not narrowly tailored. They are overinclusive as they offer no
209. George P. Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal
Protection, The Legal Invisibility of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J 1069 (1995).
210. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
211. Fallon, supra note 189, at 1328.
212. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 241 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
213. Id. at 241.
214. Id. at 241.
215. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2430 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216. See EO-1, supra note 32.
217. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). That prong requires that there
is a precise “fit” or “exact connection” between the government objective and the means chosen to
achieve those objectives. Winkler, supra note 191, at 802-06.
218. Winkler, supra note 191, 802-806.
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guidance as to how consular officers should conduct case-by-case
assessments to grant visa waivers, allowing the administration to deny visas
to Muslim applicants, even those that satisfied the administration’s security
terms.219 Justice Stephen Breyer, in his Dissenting Opinion, illustrates the
orders’ overinclusive-ness, highlighting the fact that “[w]hile more than
15,000 Syrian refugees arrived in the United States in 2016, only 13 have
arrived since January 2018.”220 This suggests that the administration’s
waiver system is excluding applicants for religious reasons; even as the
administration “claim[s] that the Proclamation rests on security needs . . . it
is excluding Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own terms.”221 An
order justified by national security that excludes those who do not affect
national security is by definition overinclusive. Although the order does not
facially contain these consequences, it is being applied in a way which doesand should therefore be reviewed in a way reflecting that.
The travel ban orders are simultaneously underinclusive. They omit
countries that remain hotbeds for terrorist activity, such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, while including two non-Muslim countries, Venezuela and
North Korea, which do not in any way prevent foreign terrorists from
entering the United States.222 Furthermore, North Korea does not willingly
allow citizens to travel outside of its borders, and there were already
sanctions in place restricting the entry of North Korean nationals to the
United States.223 The inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea appears to be
pretextual, “if not entirely symbolic.”224 A ban on the entry of Martians
would be just as necessary. Moreover, the ban on Venezuelans only applies
to a “handful of Venezuelan government officials and their immediate family
members,” presumably for political reasons.225 Therefore, “the President’s
inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela does little to mitigate the antiMuslim animus that permeates the Proclamation.”226 Furthermore, including
Chad on the suspension list is puzzling, since “[t]he number of Chadian
refugees allowed into the U.S. in the 2017 fiscal year was seven, according

219. Trump, 138 U.S. at 2431-33.
220. Id. at 2431.
221. Trump, 138 U.S. at 2430 (“How could the Government successfully claim that the
Proclamation rests on security needs if it is excluding Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own
terms? At the same time, denying visas to Muslims who meet the Proclamation’s own security
terms would support the view that the Government excludes them for reasons based upon their
religion.”).
222. Id. at 2442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Trump, 138 U.S. at 2431-33.
226. Id.
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to a State Department database.”
Since there were so few Chadians
entering the country as it is, prohibiting their further entry seems unlikely to
affect national security at all. More likely, the administration included them
to add a country outside of the Middle East to the exclusion list, thus further
obscuring the order’s anti-Muslim bias. Think back to McCreary, and the
dilution of their religious motive with secular documents. If the ban on
Muslims is the President’s liquor, he attempts to dilute it with the
inclusion of North Korea, Venezuela, and Chad. Simply put, the means
do not fit the end.

Conclusion
Under Section 1182(f), Trump v. Hawaii grants unfettered discretion to
Presidents to impose suspensions of entry of foreign nationals into the United
States.228 Therefore, Congress must reassert itself in immigration policy. For
instance, Congress may require the President to notify it before he imposes
other travel bans. Congress can amend Section 1182(f) in its yearly National
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”). It may also require congressional
approval of such bans after a period of time. This is not a novel idea.
Congress did this previously, by requiring the President to notify it 30 days
before he transferred a detainee from Guantanamo Bay to another country.229
It went further and banned construction of any detention facility in the United
States for Guantanamo Bay detainees.230 The President might be inclined to
sign an act with such restrictions, because the NDAA allocates over 700
billion dollars to the United States Department of Defense annually.231
227. Krishadev Calamur, Why Was Chad Included in the New Travel Ban? The Country Is A
Key U.S. Counterterrorism Ally, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2017).
228. Trump., 138 U.S. at 2408 (“By its plain language, §1182(f) grants the President broad
discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States . . . By its terms, §1182(f) exudes
deference to the President in every clause.”) (emphasis added).
229. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 10 U.S.C. § 3744 § 1035(d)
(2014) (“The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of a
determination of the Secretary under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 30 days before the transfer
or release of the individual under such subsection.”) (emphasis added).
230. 10 U.S.C. § 1033(a) (“No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available to the Department of Defense may be used during the period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2014, to construct or modify any facility in the
United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual detained at Guantanamo . . . .”).
231. See FY 2020 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, https://
www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY%202020%20NDAA%20Executive%20Sum
mary.pdf. (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“The NDAA supports a total of $750 billion in fiscal year
2020 funding for national defense, in line with the budget request . . . .”). While President Obama
expressed constitutional reservations about the notification requirement, he still signed the bill into
law: “[T]he Congress has enacted unwarranted and burdensome restrictions that have impeded my
ability to transfer detainees from Guantanamo . . . . Section 1035 does not, however, eliminate all
of the unwarranted limitations on foreign transfers and, in certain circumstances, would violate
constitutional separation of powers principles.” Press Release, Statement by the President on H.R.
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If the President places himself in a standoff with Congress over these
restrictions, like the historic 35-day government shut down, then Congress
should consider radical measures.232 Trump v. Hawaii presents serious
consequences. The President now can impose any restriction as a
requirement for entry in this country.233 Those restrictions are limitless, and
could conceivably include bans, detentions, interviews, and even
interrogations.234 Since this President stated that he would use torture during
interrogations of suspected terrorists, he can evoke Section 1182(f) to
accomplish illegal and unconstitutional goals.235 He has already done so.
The travel bans arguably committed several constitutional violations: (1)
Oath, (2) Nobility, (3) Bill of Attainder, (4) Corruption of Blood, (5)
Establishment and (6) Free Exercise Clauses.236 There were possible Due
Process and Equal Protection arguments available to plaintiffs too.237 There
were, depending on the strength of these arguments, eight possible
constitutional grounds to make claims against the President. The solution is
neither easy nor politically desirable.
The normal means to check a President is two-fold: the ballot box and
legislative oversight.238 The voters can punish either the President or his
3304 (Dec. 26 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/state
ment-president-hr-3304.
232. Government Shutdown 2019, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/latest-news-updates/
government-shutdown-2019 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
233. There are no textual limitations on the restrictions the President can impose on immigrant
entry into the Nation: “Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens . . . would be
detrimental to the [national interests], he may . . . impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he
may deem to be appropriate.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
234. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408 (“[Section] 1182(f) vests the President with ‘ample power’ to
impose entry restrictions in addition to those elsewhere enumerated in the INA.”).
235. ‘I’d Bring Back A Hell Of A Lot Worse Than Waterboarding’ – Trump At Debates, RT
(Feb. 7, 2016, 10:07 AM), https://www.rt.com/usa/331629-trump-debates-waterboarding-republi
can/ (“I’ll tell you what, in the Middle East, we have people chopping the heads off Christians. We
have people chopping the heads off many other people. We have things that we have never seen
before, as a group . . . . I would bring back waterboarding and I’d bring back a hell of a lot worse
than waterboarding.”).
236. U.S. CONST. article II, § 1, cl. 8: (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J. concurring) (arguing that government sponsored racial discrimination
violates the Nobility, Attainder, and No Corruption of Blood Clauses); perhaps, similar arguments
can be made against government sponsored religious discrimination using these Clauses. See, e.g.,
McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (finding that government litigation positions do not erase its
religious purpose); Santeria (identifying a religious gerrymander).
237. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down government action inspired by animus);
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendments protects an
individual’s dignity under the law).
238. See Robert Longley, Congressional Oversight and the U.S. Government, THOUGHTCO
(May 25, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/congressional-oversight-4177013; Tom Murse, OneTerm US Presidents, List of Incumbent U.S. Presidents Denied Re-Election, THOUGHTCO (July 3,

2 - ADSIDE MACROED 11-16-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2020]

12/12/2019 2:23 PM

IT’S A BLOWHORN NOT A DOG WHISTLE

301

party at the polls, but this opportunity only occurs every two or four years,
leaving plenty of time for executive abuse.239 Constitutional checks,
however, should prevent this malfeasance. But when the Court interprets
executive discretion to such an extent that it untethers him from the
Constitution itself, then normal political checks, even judicial review, may
no longer be effective against a rogue President. Trump v. Hawaii’s
submission to President Trump’s unconstitutional conduct can destroy the
Republic, and give ultimate power to the very sort of demagogue which the
Founders feared. This is no time for slow deliberation. In these
circumstances, Congress may have to consider a nuclear option.
As of this writing, it is doing so against President Trump—albeit for
different reasons. In addition to their potential Articles of Impeachment, the
United States House of Representatives should pass the following article:
Impeaching, President of the United States for high crimes and
misdemeanors, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States and, to the best of
his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, enforced policies upon religious
minorities that violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
and statutes enacted to stop them.240
The article will not pass the Senate.241 The Senate has never removed
a President from office.242 But impeachment would make a statement that is
not a dog whistle, but a blowhorn.

2019), https://www.thought co.com/one-term-us-presidents-3322257 (“There have been nearly a
dozen one-term presidents who ran for second terms but were denied by voters, but only three oneterm presidents since World War II. The most recent one-term president who lost his re-election
bid was George H.W. Bush, a Republican who lost to Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992.”).
239. Niall McCarthy, Historically, The President’s Party Performs Poorly In The Midterms,
FORBES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/10/09/historically-thepresidents-party-performs-poorly-in-the-midterms-infographic/#4620e3ca6732 (“Since 1946, the
average midterm loss for the president’s party is 25 seats.”).
240. See Approved Articles Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 1998), https://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm
241. While the Democratic Party controls the U.S. House of Representative, President
Trump’s party—the Republican Party—controls the Senate. Thus, his removal from office is
nearly impossible. Senate Election Results 2018, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/
results.
242. Tara Law, What to Know About the U.S. Presidents Who’ve Been Impeached, TIME (May
13, 2019), https://time.com/5552679/impeached-presidents/ (“Impeaching an American President
is rare. It’s only happened twice in American history—to Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill
Clinton—and neither of those times resulted in a president being removed from office.”).
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